INTRODUCTION
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution protects individuals against arbitrary and unreasonable searches and seizures. 1 Fourth amendment protection has repeatedly been found to include a general requirement of a warrant based on probable cause for any search or seizure by a law enforcement agent. 2 However, there exist a limited number of "specifically established and well delineated exceptions" 3 to the warrant requirement. In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 4 the Supreme Court established the plain view doctrine which, under certain circumstances, permits police seizure of evidence in plain view without a warrant. 5 Although the Court had previously addressed some of the ambiguities created by the 1 The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
The fourth amendment is applied to the states through incorporation in the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963 Appeals 1985 Appeals -1986 , 75 GEO. L.J. 713, 722-23 (1987) .
3 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (footnote omitted)(holding that electronic surveillance of a telephone booth constituted a fourth amendment search). For a discussion of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement see generally 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 4.1(a), at 118 (2d ed. 1987).
4 403 U.S. 443 (1971)(plurality opinion). 5 Id. at 464-71. In Coolidge the Court held that although the police can, in some instances, seize evidence in plain view without a warrant, seizure of petitioner's car was not justified becase the police had adequate time to obtain a warrant, were aware of the car's description and location, intended to seize it when they entered petitioner's property, and no contraband or dangerous objects were involved. Id. at 472. See infra note 27 for an explanation of the plain view doctrine.
III. THE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS

A. THE MAJORITY
In an opinion written by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court affirmed the Arizona Court of Appeals' holding that the recording of the serial numbers constituted an additional search unrelated to the exigency justifying the initial search. 2 9 The Court held that such additional searches and seizures could be justified under the plain view doctrine 3 0 only if the police had probable cause to believe the object of the intrusion was contraband or evidence of a crime. The majority first decided that the recording of the serial numbers constituted a search, but not a seizure, for fourth amendment purposes. 3 2 While noting that Officer Nelson's actions led to the eventual seizure of the stereo equipment, Justice Scalia stated that such actions alone did not amount to a seizure because they "did not 'meaningfully interfere' with respondent's possessory interest in either the serial numbers or the equipment." 3 3 Justice Scalia concluded that Officer Nelson's actions did, however, constitute an additional search independent of the original lawful search for the assailant, victims, and weapons. Justice Scalia distinguished the facts of this case from the simple copying of an already visible serial number because Officer Nelson physically manuevered an object to expose its serial number. 3 5 According to Justice Scalia, the copying of an already visible serial number would not involve an additional search because the mere inspection of parts of an object coming into view during a lawful search would produce no additional invasion of respondent's privacy interest. 3 
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SUPREME COURT REVIEW privacy interest which was unjustified by the exigency authorizing the entry. 3 7 The Court stressed that this new invasion of respondent's privacy constituted a separate and additional search.
38
Justice Scalia asserted that the majority's distinction between "looking" at an object in plain view and "moving" that same object, albeit a few inches, was not trivial under the fourth amendment. 3 9 He emphasized that it was irrelevant that, in this case, the search uncovered nothing of great personal value to the respondent. 40 Summarizing the majority position, Justice Scalia stated that " [a] search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable. After concluding that Officer Nelson's actions constituted a search and, therefore, implicated a fourth amendment right, Justice Scalia then identified the remaining question as "whether the search was 'reasonable' under the Fourth Amendment." 4 2 He began his analysis by explicitly stating that Officer Nelson's actions were not, ipso facto, unreasonable simply because they were unrelated to the justification authorizing entry into respondent's apartment. 43 Justice Scalia noted that acts justified under the plain view doctrine are always unrelated to the initial lawful entry. 4 4 Furthermore, Justice Scalia explained that the limitation on the scope of warrantless searches set forth in Mincey v. Arizona 4 5 was meant to apply exclusively to the scope of the primary search itself.46
Court stated: "If the inspection by police does not intrude upon a legitimate expectation of privacy, there is 'no search' subject to the Warrant Clause." Id. at 771. 37 Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1152.
Id. 39 Id. Justice Scalia was defending the majority's position against Justice Powell's claim that the majority's "distinction between 'looking' at a suspicious object in plain view and 'moving' it even a few inches trivializes the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 1157 (Powell, J., dissenting 44 Id. Justice Scalia explained that if an act was taken in furtherance of the purposes justifying the original entry, invocation of the plain view doctrine would be superfluous.
Id.
45 437 U.S. 385 (1978) . In Mincey, the Court stated that "a warrantless search must be 'strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation.' " Id. at 393 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1968) 
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Next, the majority explicitly held that probable cause was required to justify a seizure under the plain view doctrine. 5 7 "To say otherwise," noted Justice Scalia, "would be to cut the 'plain view' doctrine loose from its theoretical and practical moorings." 5 8 Justice Scalia explained that the purpose of the plain view doctrine was to extend to nonpublic places the police's authority to make warrantless seizures of such items as weapons or contraband. 59 According to Justice Scalia, the reason for the extension was to grant the police permission to seize, without a warrant, evidence which they had legitimately seen, thus sparing them the inconvenience and the risk of securing a warrant. 60 The majority emphasized that " [d] ispensing with the need for a warrant is worlds apart from permitting a lesser standard of cause for the seizure than a warrant would require, i.e. the standard of probable cause." ' 6 1 The majority then declared that an object viewed during an unrelated search and seizure should not routinely be seizable on lesser grounds than would be necessary for the procurement of a warrant to seize that same object.
62
The Court, however, recognized that seizures could be justified on less than probable cause if the "seizure is minimally intrusive and operational necessities render it the only practicable means of detecting certain types of crime." 6 3 Noting that no operational necessities were relied upon in this case, Justice Scalia emphasized that Officer Nelson's lawful viewing of the objects in plain view could not supplant the requirement of probable cause. 64 Next, the majority extended the probable cause requirement stances, a degree of suspicion lower than probable cause would be sufficient basis for a seizure in certain cases." Brown, 460 U.S. at 742 n.7 (plurality opinion). 57 Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1153. [Vol. 78
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necessary for plain view seizures to plain view searches. 65 Justice Scalia stated that "[tihe same considerations preclude us from holding that, even though probable cause would have been necessary for a seizure, the search of objects in plain view that occurred here could be sustained on lesser grounds." 66 Acknowledging that the fourth amendment's injunction against unreasonable searches protected an interest quite different from its injunction against unreasonable seizures, the majority noted that both interests deserved the same degree of protection. 67 Because the Court had not previously drawn a categorical distinction between the two interests regarding "the degree of justification needed to establish the reasonableness of police action," 68 the majority saw no reason to do so here. Justice Scalia explained that by requiring probable cause for searches, the Court was preserving its earlier mandate that "the 'plain view' doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges."
69
Justice Scalia next defended the majority's position against the dissents ofJustices Powell and O'Connor. He disagreed withJustice O'Connnor's view that Officer Nelson's conduct should have been upheld because it was a "cursory inspection" rather than a "fullblown search" and could, thus, be justified by a reasonable suspicion. 70 The majority defined a "cursory inspection" as merely "looking at what is already exposed to view, without disturbing it.
' ' 71 Such an inspection, reasoned the majority, does not constitute a search and does not require even a reasonable suspicion. 72 Justice Scalia declared that the majority was "unwilling to send police and judges into a new thicket of Fourth Amendment law, to seek a creature of uncertain description that is neither a plain-view inspection nor yet a 'full-blown search.' '73 65 Id. 66 While recognizing that sometimes no effective means other than a search will suffice, Justice Scalia stated "there is nothing new in the realization that the Constitutuion sometimes insulates the criminality of a few in order to protect the privacy of us all." 7 8 Justice Scalia described the majority's disagreement with the dissenters as a conflict about where the proper balance should be struck. 79 He asserted that the majority's position adhered to the "textual and traditional standard of probable cause." 8 0
Finally, the Court declined to consider the state's contention that the court below should have admitted the evidence under the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule, even if Officer Nelson's search was in violation of the fourth amendment. 8 1 Justice Scalia reiterated that certiorari was not granted on that issue and refused to consider it. 82 The majority then affirmed the judgment of the Arizona Court of Appeals. 
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B. JUSTICE WHITE'S CONCURRENCE
Although he agreed with the majority, Justice White reiterated his view that "inadvertent discovery" was not necessarily an element of the plain-view doctrine. 84 Noting that this "requirement" has never been accepted by a majority of the Court,Justice White joined the majority opinion "without regard to the inadvertence of the officers' discovery of the stereo components' serial numbers. 8 5
C. JUSTICE POWELL'S DISSENT
Justice Powell dissented in order to emphasize what he regarded as the unfortunate consequences of the majority's decision. 8 6 Justice Powell interpreted the Coolidge 8V plurality opinion as requiring "only that it be 'immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the "plain-view" doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges.' "88 Claiming that in the instant case there was no such general exploratory search, Justice Powell agreed with Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion that the moving of a suspicious object in plain view produces a minimal invasion of privacy. 8 9 Justice Powell characterized the majority's distinction between "merely looking at" and "moving" or "disturbing" an object in plain view as unreasonable. 90 According to Justice Powell, the facts of Hicks evidenced the unreasonableness of the majority's distinction. 9 ' He asserted that the officer's suspicion that the stereo equipment was stolen was "both reasonable and based on specific articulable facts." 92 Next, Justice Powell reiterated the Court's holding that there was an unlawful search of the turntable, although there was no seizure. 98 Justice Powell reasoned that, under the Court's decision, if police headquarters had identified as stolen one of the components with a visible serial number, the evidence would have been admissible. 99 However, noted Justice Powell, the majority held that, because the turntable was moved, a search had taken place. 10 0 Justice Powell stressed that the "distinction between 'looking' at a suspicious object in plain view and 'moving' it even a few inches trivializes the Fourth Amendment. 10 1 Finally, Justice Powell predicted that the new rule announced by the Court "will cause uncertainty, and could deter conscientious police officers from lawfully obtaining evidence necessary to convict guilty persons." 10 2 He also cautioned that the Court's rule "may handicap law enforcement without enhancing privacy interests."' Justice O'Connor began by explaining that Coolidge required, in order for a plain view search to be lawful, that (1) the initial intrusion providing the officer with an opportunity to view an area be lawful; (2) the officer "inadvertently" discover the incriminating evidence; and (3) it be "immediately apparent" to the officer that the observed items may be contraband or evidence of a crime.' 0 8 Justice O'Connor then stated that, although these three requirements have never been expressly adopted by a majority of the Court, "as the considered opinion of four members of this Court [they] should obviously be the point of reference for further discussion of the issue."109 Next, Justice O'Connor found that the first two Coolidge requirements had been satisfied in this case because the officers were in Hicks' apartment legally and their discovery of the turntable was inadvertent. 1 "Instead," stated Justice O'Connor, "the dispute in this case focuses on the application of the 'immediately apparent' requirement; at issue is whether a police officer's reasonable suspicion is adequate to justify a cursory examination of an item in plain 104 plurality opinion) ). The Brown Court thought that the three requirements should be the reference point for further discussion because they were the Coolidge plurality's considered opinion. Brown, 460 U.S. at 737. 110 Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1157. Justice O'Connor noted that the officers were legally in Hicks' apartment because of exigent circumstances. She also contended that the discovery of the turntable was inadvertent because the officers did not know in advance that the evidence would be in the apartment. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) .
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According to justice O'Connor, the "immediately apparent" requirement protects fourth amendment rights by preventing "general, exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings." ' 12 She reasoned that the Court's requirement that an item's relevance be "immediately apparent" prevented limited searches from evolving into indiscriminate searches of any and all items in plain view."1 3 Thus, Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority that probable cause was necessary to justify seizures and "full-blown searches" of evidence in plain view."1 4 However, Justice O'Connor argued that probable cause was not necessary to validate a "mere inspection" of a suspicious item in plain view. 1 15 Justice O'Connor asserted that a cursory inspection of a suspicious item in plain view involved no "exploratory rummaging," affected only items "reasonably suspect[ed]" to be evidence of a crime, and was quite limited in scope.' " 6 She argued that "if police officers have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that an object they come across during the course of a lawful search is evidence of crime . . . they may make a cursory examination of the object to verify their suspicion." ' 1 7 Justice O'Connor then concluded that officers need probable cause to examine an object only if their investigation extends beyond such a cursory inspection. 120 Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1158. In Stanley, police officers conducting a warranted search of appellant's home for evidence of bookmaking found three rolls of film. Stanley, 394 U.S. 557. The officers viewed the films on a projector and arrested appellant for possession of obscene materials. Id. The Court held that it was unconstitutional under the first and fourteenth amendments to make private possession of obscene material a crime. Id. at 568. In his concurrence, Justice Stewart asserted that the case should have been decided on fourth amendment grounds. Id. at 569 (Stewart, J., concurring).
776
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Justice O'Connor then stated that the "majority of both state and federal courts have held that probable cause is not required for a minimal inspection of an item in plain view." 121 Quoting Professor LaFave, she explained that the majority of courts presumed that "the minimal additional intrusion which results from an inspection or examination of an object in plain view is reasonable if the officer was first aware of some facts and circumstances which justify a reasonable suspicion (not probable cause, in the traditonal sense) that the object is or contains a fruit, instrumentality, or evidence of a crime." 12 2
Thus, Justice O'Connor concluded that courts required only a reasonable suspicion for cursory examinations and that such cursory examinations included the acts of lifting or moving an object to obtain a better view. 123 Justice O'Connor then pointed out that a number of state courts have employed a reasonable suspicion standard in cases very similar to this one.
124
Although he believed that the films should have been suppressed, Justice Stewart seemed to suggest that more minimally intrusive inspections would be lawful: "This is not a case where agents in the course of a lawful search came upon contraband, criminal activity, or criminal evidence in plain view. For the record makes clear that the contents of the films could not be determined by mere inspection." Id. at 571 (Stewart, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). 
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Furthermore, Justice O'Connor maintained that distinguishing searches according to their degree of intrusiveness was consistent with the Court's fourth amendment jurisprudence. 125 She noted that the Court has recognized that the intrusiveness of searches can differ and that "some brief searches 'may be so minimally intrusive' of Fourth Amendment interests that strong countervailing governmental interests will justify a [search] based only on specific articulable facts' that the item in question is contraband or evidence of a crime."' 2 6 Justice O'Connor pointed out that in Delaware v. Prouse 1 27 the Court held that the permissibilty of a law enforcement practice should be determined by balancing its intrusion on citizens' fourth amendment rights against its advancement of legitimate governmental interests.1 28 She then noted that where this balancing indicated that a standard of reasonableness that "stops short of probable cause" best effectuated the public interest, the Court has "not hesitated to adopt such a standard."' 12 9 Justice O'Connor stressed that the test was not whether "operational necessities render [a standard less than probable cause] the only practicable means of detecting certain types of crimes."' 130 Rather, Justice O'Connor declared the test to be whether the law enforcement interests are substantial enough to warrant the adoption of a reasonable suspicion standard. Furthermore, Justice O'Connor asserted that this minor invasion of privacy must be weighed against substantial gains in law enforcement. 136 Noting that serial numbers were a powerful law enforcement mechanism, 3 7 Justice O'Connor reasoned that the weighing of governmental interests against private interests supported the view that fourth amendment requirements were satisfied by a reasonable suspicion standard.
138
Justice O'Connor then declared that, in its attempt to set out a bright line rule, the majority had "ignore[d] a substantial body of precedent and... [placed] serious roadblocks to reasonable law enforcement practices."' 139 She pointed out that, in this particular case, the officers could not have secured a search warrant on the basis of reasonable suspicion nor, under the Court's position, could they have moved the turntable to record the serial number. 140 Justice O'Connor found that the "theoretical advantages of the 'search is a search' approach adopted by the Court ... are simply too remote tojustify the tangible and profound damage it inflicts on legitimate and effective law enforcement."' 14 1
Moreover, Justice O'Connor asserted that even if the proper standard in this case was probable cause, it would have been satisfied. 14 2 She reasoned that when police officers, conducting a lawful search, come across the "tools of a thief" and observe expensive stereo equipment which seem incongrous with their surroundings, "the 'flexible commonsense standard' of probable cause has been satisfied."1 4 3 134 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (permitting a reasonable search for weapons for the police officer's protection if he has reason to believe an individual is armed and dangerous, regardless of whether officer has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime). When police officers, during the course of a search inquiring into a grievously unlawful activity, discover the tools of a thief (a sawed-off rifle and a stocking mask) and observe in a small apartment two sets of stereo equipment that are both inordinately expensive in relation to their surroundings and known to be favored targets of larcenous activity, the 'flexible commonsense standard' of probable cause has been satisfied.
Id.
(O'Connor, J, dissenting)(emphasis in original)(citation omitted).
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Finally, Justice O'Connor concluded by stating that she dissented with the Court's opinion because it "ignores the existence of probable cause and in doing so upsets a widely accepted body of precedent on the standard of reasonableness for the cursory examination of evidence in plain view."' 144 IV. ANALYSIS Although the Court has previously attempted to delineate ground rules governing the applicability of the plain view doctrine, ambiguity remains concerning the degree of cause necessary for the doctrine's invocation.' 4 5 Lower courts, both federal and state, have yet to decide conclusively whether probable cause or reasonable suspicion is needed in order to invoke the plain view doctrine.' 46 In Hicks, the Court explicitly set out the minimum standard by holding that probable cause was required to justify searches and seizures of items in plain view.1' 4 The majority's decision went much further than simply establishing a bright line rule for -determining the applicability of the plain view doctrine. In order to reach this issue, the Court initially decided that a fourth amendment interest had been implicated. 148 The Court's holding that the police action in Hicks constituted a search will have an extensive impact upon future police conduct. Absent probable cause, the police cannot search or seize an item in plain view. 14 9 Moreover, a fourth amendment search includes the manipulation of an item in order to record its serial number when that serial number is not plainly visible. I5 0 Although the dissenting Justices agreed with the majority that probable cause was required for plain view searches and seizures, the Court was divided on the 144 
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question of what conduct constitutes a search. 1 5 ' The Hicks' majority holding that the moving of an object to record its serial number constitutes a search respects individuals' privacy interests, and by requiring probable cause for plain view searches and seizures, the Court prevents unreasonable police intrusion upon individuals' privacy interests.
A.
IMPLICATION OF A FOURTH AMENDMENT INTEREST
The threshold issue in Hicks concerned whether an additional search or seizure occurred beyond the initial lawful search. 152 The fourth amendment's proscriptions apply only to governmental acts which are searches and seizures. 153 Hence, if Officer Nelson's actions did not amount to either a search or seizure, they need not have been reasonable because they would not be governed by the fourth amendment. The majority reasoned that Officer Nelson's movement of the turntable to record its serial numbers violated Hicks' privacy and constituted a search. 155 The dissenting Justices, however, regarded Officer Nelson's actions as an insignificant invasion of Hicks' privacy and vehemently objected to the majority's holding that Officer Nelson's actions constituted a search. A search is any governmental action which intrudes upon a legitimate expectation of privacy.' 5 7 Traditionally, courts have employed a two-part test to determine the existence of a legitimate expectation of privacy. 158 This test, proposed by Justice Harlan in
